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ESSAY 
A MATTER OF CONTEXT:  SOCIAL 
FRAMEWORK EVIDENCE IN EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION CLASS ACTIONS 
Melissa Hart* 
Paul M. Secunda** 
In litigation disputes over the certification of employment discrimination 
class actions, social scientists have come to play a central, yet 
controversial, role.  Organizational behavioralists and social psychologists 
regularly testify for the plaintiffs, offering what is commonly referred to as 
social framework testimony.  These experts explain the general social 
science research on the operation of stereotyping and bias in decision 
making and examine the challenged workplace to identify those policies 
and practices that research has shown will tend to increase and those that 
will tend to limit the likely impact of these factors.  Defendants fight hard 
against the admission of social framework experts, and some courts have 
agreed that the testimony should not be allowed.  Because of the 
importance of this testimony to ferreting out large-scale discrimination in 
the workplace, the stakes in the debate over its admissibility are 
considerable. 
This Essay puts the debate over social framework expert testimony in 
context, explaining what the testimony is and the role it has played in 
employment discrimination litigation, with a particular focus on the way the 
testimony has been offered in class action suits like Dukes v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc.  It explains how the normal rules of evidence law should apply 
to social framework expert testimony and demonstrates that under the 
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flexible and permissive standards of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
framework testimony offered by a qualified expert should be admissible in 
many employment class actions.  Arguments put forward recently that this 
kind of evidence should always be excluded is driven as much by a 
particular view of employment discrimination law as by the governing 
evidentiary rules.  Ultimately, the arguments for blanket exclusion of social 
framework testimony in these cases can best be understood as part of a 
political debate and a litigation strategy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the high-stakes world of class action employment discrimination 
litigation, the battle over expert testimony often determines the fate of the 
case.  If the district court accepts the plaintiffs’ social science expert 
testimony, chances are high that the proposed class will be certified.  On the 
other hand, rejection of the expert evidence generally comes hand-in-hand 
with a denial of class certification.  In the first instance, settlement of the 
case is likely to follow, and in the second, the defendant will probably face 
relatively few individual suits from employees who would have been 
members of the class.  It is no surprise, then, that defendants pull out all the 
stops to convince the courts to exclude plaintiffs’ experts. 
The particular social science testimony that plays such a central role in 
this litigation is commonly referred to as “social framework” evidence.  In 
employment litigation, an expert offering social framework testimony will 
explain the general social science research on the operation of stereotyping 
and bias in decision making and will examine the policies and practices 
operating in the workplace at issue to identify those that research has shown 
will tend to increase or limit the likely impact of these factors.  For several 
decades now, courts have accepted social framework evidence in 
employment litigation, but its use has not been without controversy.  
Defendants fight hard against the admission of testimony by social 
framework experts, and some courts have agreed that the testimony should 
not be allowed.  Because of the importance of this testimony to the success 
of class action suits designed to ferret out large-scale discrimination in the 
workplace, the stakes in the debate over its admissibility are considerable. 
The debate has moved recently from the courtroom to the pages of law 
reviews.  In an essay published last fall, three academics—one of whom 
also works as an expert witness and consultant for defendants opposing the 
admissibility of social framework evidence1—argued that social framework 
 1. Gregory Mitchell is one of the partners in Tetlock and Mitchell, LLC, a company 
that offers “expert witness and consulting services in labor and employment matters.” 
Tetlock and Mitchell, LLC, http://www.tetmitch.net (last visited Sept. 20, 2009).  In the past 
several years, Philip Tetlock and Gregory Mitchell have worked as experts and consultants 
for Eli Lilly, Cintas Corporation, Eastman Kodak, Northrop Grumman, Morgan Stanley, 
Wal-Mart, and BellSouth. See, e.g., Defendant Eli Lilly & Co.’s Brief in Opposition to 
Plaintiff’s Motion to Modify the Case Management Plan and Request to Suspend CMP 
Deadlines, Welch v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 1:06-cv-0641-RLY-JMS (S.D. Ind. Feb. 17, 2009); 
Expert Report of Philip E. Tetlock, Ph.D., Serrano v. Cintas Corp., No. 04-CV-40132 (E.D. 
Mich. May 21, 2008); Memorandum of Law of Defendant Eastman Kodak Co. in Opposition 
to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Privileged Information, Employees Committed for Justice v. 
Eastman Kodak Co., No. 6:04-CV-06098-CJS(F) (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 2008); Plaintiff’s 
Motion in Limine to Preclude Certain Proposed Expert Testimony of Philip E. Tetlock, 
Dodson v. Morgan Stanley DW Inc., No. 3:06-cv-5669RJB (W.D. Wash. Nov. 19, 2007); 
Report of Gregory Mitchell, Ph.D., Bridgewater v. Northrop Grumman Ship Sys., Inc., No. 
1:06-cv-00769-HSO-JMR (S.D. Miss. Nov. 9, 2007), 2007 WL 4267340; Plaintiffs’ Motion 
to Exclude Testimony of Dr. Gregory Mitchell, Anderson v. Northrop Grumman Ship Sys., 
Inc., No. 1:06-CV-764-HSO-JMR (S.D. Miss. Nov. 9, 2007); Expert Report of Philip E. 
Tetlock, Ph.D., Nelson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 245 F.R.D. 358 (E.D. Ark. 2006) (No. 2:04-
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testimony as it is commonly accepted by district courts should be 
categorically disallowed.2  In Contextual Evidence of Gender 
Discrimination, authors John Monahan, Laurens Walker, and Gregory 
Mitchell argue that courts should never let social scientists link general 
social science findings to an employer’s specific workplace policies unless 
the proffered expert has conducted his or her own empirical research in that 
particular workplace.3 
As we will explain here, the arguments for categorically excluding such 
testimony are fundamentally flawed.  Social framework evidence, offered 
by qualified social scientists, plays a central role in modern employment 
discrimination litigation.  By offering insight into the operation of 
stereotyping and bias in decision making, social framework experts can 
help fact finders to assess other evidence more accurately.  When an expert 
applies her knowledge of studies in her field to an examination of the 
policies in place at a challenged workplace, the resulting testimony is well 
within what is permitted by the Federal Rules of Evidence.  There is no 
basis in evidence law for requiring experts to conduct firsthand empirical 
studies of a particular workplace.  Moreover, in the particular context of 
class action litigation, social framework evidence certainly satisfies the 
central admissibility criterion of relevance or “fit”—it is “valid for the 
purpose for which it is offered.”4  In large employment class action suits 
like the landmark Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.5 gender discrimination 
litigation, plaintiffs offer social framework testimony at the class 
certification stage of the litigation to address the issue of whether the 
plaintiffs share a common question of fact or law that will satisfy federal 
class action standards.  The legal question of commonality is directly 
addressed by the social scientist’s expertise.  Thus, a categorical exclusion 
of this evidence is inconsistent with the Federal Rules of Evidence and U.S. 
Supreme Court precedent on the district courts’ responsibility for assessing 
the admissibility of expert testimony more generally. 
This essay begins by putting the debate over social framework expert 
testimony in context.  Part I explains what social framework testimony is 
and the central role it has played in numerous types of employment 
discrimination litigation, with a particular focus on the way the testimony 
has been offered in class action suits like Dukes.  Part II evaluates the 
claims made by Monahan, Walker, and Mitchell in their recent essay and 
cv-00171-WRW); Expert Report of Philip E. Tetlock, Ph.D., Jenkins v. BellSouth Corp., No. 
2:02-CV-01057-VEH (N.D. Ala. May 23, 2005).   
 2. John Monahan, Laurens Walker & Gregory Mitchell, Contextual Evidence of 
Gender Discrimination:  The Ascendance of “Social Frameworks,” 94 VA. L. REV. 1715, 
1718–19 (2008) [hereinafter Contextual Evidence of Gender Discrimination]. 
 3. Id. at 1736–42. 
 4. David L. Faigman, Nilanjana Dasgupta & Cecilia L. Ridgeway, A Matter of Fit:  The 
Law of Discrimination and the Science of Implicit Bias, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1389, 1390 
(2008). 
 5. 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal. 2004), aff’d, 509 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2007), reh’g en 
banc granted, Nos. 04-16688, 04-16720, 2009 WL 365818 (9th Cir. Feb. 13, 2009). 
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demonstrates how their arguments about the admissibility of this kind of 
expert testimony run contrary to basic principles regarding the admissibility 
of expert testimony more generally.  As we explain, the normal rules of 
evidence law should apply to social framework expert testimony, and under 
the flexible and permissive standards of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
framework testimony offered by a qualified expert will be admissible in 
many employment class actions.  The argument that this kind of evidence 
should always be excluded is driven not by the governing evidentiary rules 
but by a particular view of employment discrimination law.  Part III situates 
the arguments over social framework testimony in the context of the larger 
debate over what kinds of discrimination claims the law should permit.  
Ultimately, the arguments for exclusion of social framework testimony are 
best understood as part of a political debate and a litigation strategy.  
Ignoring either the political or the litigation context of these arguments 
leaves an incomplete picture. 
I.  SOCIAL FRAMEWORK TESTIMONY IN EMPLOYMENT  
DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION 
Social framework testimony has become a central element of many 
employment discrimination disputes over the past two decades.  In these 
cases, a plaintiff or plaintiffs typically will put forward a social 
psychologist or expert in organizational behavior to testify about the 
widespread incidence of stereotyping and bias, and to identify within the 
challenged workplace those policies that tend to permit or to discourage 
operation of such bias.6  As many scholars have noted, workplace 
discrimination today is more subtle—often involving structural and 
organizational norms that are less easy to identify as discriminatory—than 
the explicit exclusions that characterized early civil rights litigation.7  These 
more subtle forms of exclusion and denial of opportunity often involve 
policies or practices that permit stereotyping and bias to infect workplace 
decisions.  In particular, scholars have pointed to excessively subjective 
decisionmaking structures, without sufficient guidance or monitoring, as 
likely to exclude or otherwise disadvantage women and minorities in the 
workplace.8  An expert offering social framework testimony can provide 
context and explanation of the ways in which these patterns occur.  This 
form of expert evidence has been central in sexual harassment cases and in 
 6. See, e.g., Jane Goodman & Robert T. Croyle, Social Framework Testimony in 
Employment Discrimination Cases, 7 BEHAV. SCI. &  L. 227, 231 (1989). 
 7. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Implicit Bias, “Science,” and Antidiscrimination 
Law, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 477, 477 (2007); Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in 
Workplace Dynamics:  Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 91 (2003); Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and 
Unconscious Discrimination, 56 ALA. L. REV. 741, 785–88 (2005); Susan Sturm, Second 
Generation Employment Discrimination:  A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 
468 (2001). 
 8. See, e.g., Tristin K. Green & Alexandra Kalev, Discrimination-Reducing Measures 
at the Relational Level, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1435 (2008). 
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both individual and class litigations challenging pay and promotion 
disparities.  It has the potential to aid in a fuller understanding of many 
other kinds of discrimination. 
This Part explains what social framework theory is and discusses one of 
the central debates over its appropriate application—the question of 
whether a social framework expert can draw direct connections between 
social science research and particular workplace policies.  An examination 
of cases in which social framework testimony has been admitted shows that 
experts do regularly draw those connections in many different types of 
employment discrimination litigation.  Of course, there are limits to the 
particular questions on which a social framework expert can offer opinions.  
As David Faigman, Nilanjana Dasgupta, and Cecilia Ridgeway recently 
noted, a classic single-plaintiff discrimination case presents risks for the 
expert who opines not only on the social science, but also on whether the 
particular plaintiff was in fact subject to discrimination.9  That opinion—
ultimately a judgment on causation—may well be outside the reliable area 
of the sociologist’s expertise.  In contrast to that circumstance, in debates 
over class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23,10 the 
question of whether the plaintiffs have identified a set of common 
employment policies and practices that may have significantly increased the 
risk of bias or stereotyping in the particular workplace is well within the 
range of what the social scientist can reliably testify about.  In the class 
certification process, the legal question is not whether any individual 
plaintiff was in fact subject to illegal discrimination, but whether the 
employer’s workplace policies create the necessary commonality.  An 
assessment of the employer’s structures and policies in light of relevant 
social science sheds light directly and appropriately on that legal question. 
A.  What Is Social Framework Expert Testimony? 
Starting about four decades ago, social scientists began offering expert 
testimony in a range of both civil and criminal cases, providing insight 
about matters such as the reliability of eyewitness identification, the effects 
of battered woman’s syndrome or other instances of post-traumatic stress, 
and the significance of cross-cultural differences in understanding the 
meaning of particular conduct.11  Experts offering this kind of testimony 
generally are psychologists, sociologists, or organizational/occupational 
behavioralists who study social cognitive psychology or industrial-
 9. See Faigman et al., supra note 4. 
 10. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 11. See, e.g., Susan T. Fiske & Eugene Borgida, Providing Expert Knowledge in an 
Adversarial Context:  Social Cognitive Science in Employment Discrimination Cases, 4 
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 123, 128 (2008); Neil J. Vidmar & Regina A. Schuller, Juries and 
Expert Evidence:  Social Framework Testimony, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 133, 134–35 
& nn.3–17 (1989) (gathering cases); Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks:  
A New Use of Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559, 563–67 (1987) (gathering cases). 
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organizational psychology.12  The function of this form of testimony is “to 
supply the triers with information about some aspect of human behavior to 
aid in interpreting disputed facts.”13  This evidence is often offered to 
challenge erroneous assumptions that a fact finder is likely to make without 
the assistance of the expertise.14 
While this use of social scientists as litigation experts had been occurring 
since the late 1970s, it was first labeled “social framework” testimony in a 
1987 law review essay penned by Laurens Walker and John Monahan (two 
of the authors of the recent Virginia Law Review essay).15  In their 1987 
essay, Walker and Monahan distinguished social framework testimony from 
two other uses of social science expert evidence, which they have since 
termed “social authority” expertise and “social fact” expertise.16  “Social 
 12. See, e.g., R. Matthew Wise, From Price Waterhouse to Dukes and Beyond:  
Bridging the Gap Between Law and Social Science by Improving the Admissibility Standard 
for Expert Testimony, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 545, 561 (2005). 
 13. Vidmar & Schuller, supra note 11, at 138; see also Eugene Borgida, Corrie Hunt & 
Anita Kim, On the Use of Gender Stereotyping Research in Sex Discrimination Litigation, 
13 J.L. & POL’Y 613, 626 (2005) [hereinafter On the Use of Gender Stereotyping Research] 
(“Social frameworks are offered to the trier of fact through expert testimony to provide a 
scientifically informed context for thinking about the matters in dispute.”); Eugene Borgida, 
Grace Deason & Anita Kim, Stereotyping Research and Employment Discrimination:  Time 
To See the Forest for the Trees, 1 INDUS. & ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOL. 405, 406 (2008) 
[hereinafter Stereotyping Research and Employment Discrimination] (“In social framework 
analysis, the scientific expert typically communicates general causation findings to provide a 
context for factfinders’ reasoning about a particular case.”); Goodman & Croyle, supra note 
6, at 231 (explaining how the expert “provides a background or framework of data in light of 
which legal and factual issues before the court can be better evaluated”).  In the first well-
known example of social framework testimony in employment litigation, for example, 
psychologist Susan Fiske explained to the court how the operation of stereotyping might 
have been at play when the partners at Price Waterhouse rejected Ann Hopkins, the only 
female candidate for the partnership that year. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 
233–36 (1989).  Her testimony, and similar evidence offered in other employment 
discrimination disputes, could be helpful to “establish the context for evaluating the facts of 
the . . . case.  Comments or actions that might otherwise be ambiguous or seem tangential to 
the dispute might take on greater meaning or more resonance in light of this proof.” Faigman 
et al., supra note 4, at 1399. 
 14. See Vidmar & Schuller, supra note 11, at 139–40; see also Gary Blasi, Advocacy 
Against the Stereotype:  Lessons from Cognitive Social Psychology, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1241 
(2002); David L. Faigman et al., Legal Issues, in 2 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE:  THE LAW 
AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 642 (David L. Faigman et al. eds., 2008) (“One 
significant value of much social science research is that it makes clearer what we only dimly 
perceive, if we perceive it at all.”); Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral 
Realism in Employment Discrimination Law:  Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 
CAL. L. REV. 997, 1062 (2006) (explaining how insights from social psychology can be 
essential to good legal decisions “because they often sharply contradict widely accepted 
psychological intuitions that judges mistakenly think provide a simple, elegant, predictive 
model of human behavior”). 
 15. Walker & Monahan, supra note 11, at 559. 
 16. See Contextual Evidence of Gender Discrimination, supra note 2, at 1720.  These 
two uses of social science in litigation were first identified by Kenneth Culp Davis, who 
articulated a distinction between “legislative facts”—facts relevant to broad social policy 
questions—and “adjudicative facts”—facts relevant to the specific litigation. See Kenneth 
Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARV. 
L. REV. 364, 402–03 (1942). 
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fact” expert testimony, the authors explained, is social science research 
done specifically to address a particular question presented in a specific 
case.17  So, for example, an expert in a trademark case might conduct a 
specific litigation-focused study to determine whether consumers can 
distinguish between two products when one is protected by trademark and 
the other is alleged to infringe the mark.18  “Social authority” expertise, by 
contrast, the authors defined as general social science evidence presented to 
establish the validity of a factual assumption underlying a legal standard, 
such as the question whether “separate” educational systems are “equal.”19 
In their 1987 essay, Walker and Monahan described “social framework” 
testimony as a third category of expert evidence that could be identified as 
distinct from these other two.20  In social framework testimony, “general 
research results are used to construct a frame of reference or background 
context for deciding factual issues crucial to the resolution of a specific 
case.”21  Thus, the social framework expert is filling a role that is similar to 
an expert testifying to social fact; in both cases, the assistance provided by 
the expert’s testimony is to help a fact finder evaluate specific facts in the 
case.  But social framework testimony is also similar to social authority 
expertise, in that both involve the expert’s presentation of general research 
studies from within the particular field.22  Social framework expert 
testimony essentially uses general social science research to help explain 
why the law should be applied in a particular way to the facts of a particular 
case. 
B.  Social Framework Evidence in Employment Discrimination Litigation 
Many courts have been presented with social framework expert 
testimony in a range of employment discrimination contexts over the past 
two decades.  Research on stereotyping has been particularly valuable to 
plaintiffs in gender discrimination litigation.  Phenomena like the “glass 
ceiling” and the “maternal wall,” which keep women from advancing 
professionally, are substantially the result of biases and stereotypes that 
social science experts can identify and explain for legal decision makers.23  
There is extensive literature in social psychology on gender stereotyping 
and its impact on assumptions about and opportunities for women at 
 17. Contextual Evidence of Gender Discrimination, supra note 2, at 1724–25; see also 
Walker & Monahan, supra note 11, at 561–62. 
 18. See, e.g., Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imps., Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670, 690–91 (S.D.N.Y. 
1963). 
 19. See Contextual Evidence of Gender Discrimination, supra note 2, at 1720–21 (citing 
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)). 
 20. Walker & Monahan, supra note 11, at 559. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Contextual Evidence of Gender Discrimination, supra note 2, at 1726. 
 23. See, e.g., Joan C. Williams, The Social Psychology of Stereotyping:  Using Social 
Science To Litigate Gender Discrimination Cases and Defang the “Cluelessness” Defense, 7 
EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 401 (2003). 
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work.24  There is also a growing body of social science work on the 
mechanisms that support or discourage the stereotypes and biases that 
permit continued operation of race discrimination in workplace decisions.25 
While social framework testimony has been introduced in a broad variety 
of discrimination suits, it is in the context of class litigation that it has 
received the most attention, perhaps because the scope of these suits is so 
large and the role of framework theory so important.  But in all of the 
employment discrimination contexts in which this evidence is presented, an 
essential element of the social framework testimony is the expert’s role in 
identifying particular policies and practices of the employer that might tend 
to make decisions susceptible to stereotyping and bias.  When social 
framework testimony is presented appropriately, the expert does not reach 
the conclusion that a specific decision was made with discriminatory intent; 
that judgment is for the fact finder.26  What the expert can do is offer his or 
her knowledge of the social science research and identify the characteristics 
of policies challenged in the particular workplace that research has linked 
with higher likelihood of bias and stereotype or lower likelihood of 
correction for bias. 
This Part briefly highlights some of the well-known employment 
discrimination cases in which social framework testimony has played a 
central role.  It then considers in more detail the function served by social 
framework experts in class action litigation. 
1.  Stereotyping, Sexual Harassment, and Frameworks in Gender 
Discrimination Litigation 
One of the earliest and most famous cases in which social framework 
testimony played a pivotal role was Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.27  Ann 
Hopkins was a candidate for partnership at Price Waterhouse in 1982.28  At 
 24. See, e.g., Diana Burgess & Eugene Borgida, Who Women Are, Who Women Should 
Be:  Descriptive and Prescriptive Gender Stereotyping in Sex Discrimination, 5 PSYCHOL. 
PUB. POL’Y & L. 665, 665 (1999). 
 25. See Fiske & Borgida, supra note 11. 
 26. See, e.g., Tuli v. Brigham & Women’s Hosp., Inc., 592 F. Supp. 2d 208 (D. Mass. 
2009).  In admitting a social framework expert, Judge Nancy Gertner recently explained, 
Professor Glick brings the insights of established scientific inquiry and social 
framework analysis, as to which he is an expert, to bear on the facts of this case.  It 
is an area that the jury may well not have common knowledge.  But Professor 
Glick does so in a way that has scientific validity:  he cannot say whether a given 
act or word was discriminatory; he can only show the settings in which 
discrimination typically occurs and opine on whether the allegations in the case at 
bar are consistent with the observed patterns.  He allows the jury to make the final 
decision and expressly disclaims the capacity to draw any conclusion in this 
particular case. 
Id. at 215–16 (citing Linda Hamilton Kreiger, The Content of Our Categories:  A Cognitive 
Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 
1161, 1187 (1995)). 
 27. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 28. Id. at 233. 
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the time she was considered, the company had only seven female partners 
and 655 male partners.29  She was the only woman being considered for 
partnership that year.30  Hopkins had an extremely successful business 
record at the firm.31  She was, however, described by some as abrasive and 
particularly hard on staff members.32  Concerns about her lack of 
interpersonal skills were of major importance to many evaluating her 
candidacy.33  In addition, among the men considering Hopkins’s 
partnership candidacy, she was described as “macho” and advised to take “a 
course at charm school,” as well as to “walk more femininely, talk more 
femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and 
wear jewelry.”34 
After reviewing the decisionmaking process used at Price Waterhouse in 
selecting partners, psychologist Susan Fiske provided expert testimony that 
included a review of the extensive literature on sex stereotyping as well as 
an analysis of the aspects of the Price Waterhouse partnership process that 
contributed to the likelihood that sex stereotyping had influenced the 
decision.35  In particular, Fiske focused on Hopkins’s uniqueness as the 
only woman in the pool of candidates, on the subjectivity of the evaluation 
process, and on the language—both explicitly discriminatory and more 
subtly biased–used to describe Hopkins.36  While much of the evidence of 
discrimination in Price Waterhouse included explicitly sexist comments 
that the jury could itself understand as discriminatory, Fiske’s testimony 
offered what the Supreme Court referred to as “icing on [the] cake” for the 
plaintiff,37 explaining the operation of sex stereotyping in all aspects of the 
decisionmaking process. 
Social framework evidence has also offered important background 
information and context to fact finders in a number of well-known sexual 
harassment cases.  In these cases, experts can help the fact finder appreciate 
the relationship between a hostile work environment and adverse 
employment actions.38  In the first sexual harassment suit brought as a class 
action, Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co.,39 the court accepted social science 
expert testimony to “provide a framework for understanding why consistent 
and pervasive acts of sexual harassment occur in work environments similar 
to Eveleth Mines.”40  Jenson was a class challenge to widespread and 
egregious sexual harassment and discrimination at a mine in northern 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 233–34. 
 32. Id. at 234–35. 
 33. Id. at 233–35. 
 34. Id. at 235. 
 35. See Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1117–18 (D.D.C. 1985). 
 36. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235–36. 
 37. Id. at 256. 
 38. See Fiske and Borgida, supra note 11, at 132. 
 39. 824 F. Supp. 847 (D. Minn. 1993). 
 40. Id. at 883. 
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Minnesota.41  One of the central questions in the case was whether the acts 
of sexual harassment suffered by the named plaintiffs and other women 
working at Eveleth were simply isolated occurrences or whether they were 
the consequence of a broader culture at the mine.42  In reaching the 
conclusion that sex stereotyping was pervasive and influential at Eveleth 
Mines, the plaintiffs’ expert reviewed the exhibits presented by the parties, 
read deposition transcripts of male and female employees and managers, 
and personally observed testimony offered during the trial.43  He evaluated 
the facts this information revealed about the work environment at Eveleth in 
light of his knowledge of the extensive social science research on sex 
stereotyping and sexual harassment.44  The expert was thus able to apply 
his knowledge of the literature in the field to what he learned about Eveleth 
Mines and to explain how the conduct at the Mines could be understood not 
as a series of isolated events but as part of a general culture of sex 
stereotyping. 
In another well-known harassment dispute, Robinson v. Jacksonville 
Shipyards, Inc.,45 social science experts similarly reviewed company 
policies and the evidence gathered in discovery, including deposition 
transcripts and company policies.  The experts were able to apply what they 
knew as social scientists in evaluating the facts uncovered through the 
litigation process to conclude that in circumstances like those in operation 
at Jacksonville Shipyards, “evaluation of women employees by their 
coworkers and supervisors takes place in terms of the sexuality of the 
women and their worth as sex objects rather than their merit as craft 
workers.”46  In these disputes, the expert offering social framework 
evidence is able to provide assistance to the jury in understanding the 
creation of social and cultural norms within a workplace and the ways in 
which sexualized conduct can affect decisions (such as work evaluations) 
that appear on their face to be unconnected. 
The potential for use of social framework testimony in employment 
discrimination litigation continues to expand as courts recognize the 
legitimacy of claims that require an understanding of the central role gender 
stereotyping plays in creating and limiting opportunities for both men and 
women.  Recent years have seen increasing attention to family 
responsibilities discrimination (FRD)—cases in which employers 
discriminate against their employees because of their obligations outside of 
work.47  These cases, which may involve pregnancy discrimination, 
discrimination against workers who have caretaking obligations for parents 
 41. Id. at 855–56. 
 42. Id. at 860. 
 43. Id. at 881. 
 44. Id. at 881–883. 
 45. 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991). 
 46. Id. at 1503. 
 47. Joan C. Williams & Stephanie Bornstein, The Evolution of “FReD”:  Family 
Responsibilities Discrimination and Developments in the Law of Stereotyping and Implicit 
Bias, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1311, 1313–14 (2008). 
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or children, or simply discrimination against parents, involve a wide range 
of stereotypes and biases that operate in the workplace.48  The number of 
FRD cases has increased exponentially in the past decade.49  While the use 
of social science experts in these disputes does not appear to be common, 
the range of psychological and sociological issues they raise make them a 
likely context in which social framework testimony might substantially aid 
the fact finder in understanding the cognitive processes that can underlie 
workplace decision making.50 
2.  Class Action Litigation and Social Frameworks 
While these different contexts have seen some amount of social 
framework testimony and the potential for expansion of framework 
evidence with novel theories of discrimination, it is in the context of large 
class action disputes that social framework testimony has been most central. 
In class action litigation like Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,51 plaintiffs 
often assert both disparate impact and disparate treatment claims,52 
challenging employer policies and practices that permit stereotyping and 
bias to infect decisionmaking processes and limit opportunities for women 
throughout the company.53  In Dukes, for example, the named plaintiffs 
sued on behalf of current and former female employees of Wal-Mart, 
alleging that women at Wal-Mart stores had been paid less than their male 
counterparts every year and in every Wal-Mart region.54  Plaintiffs’ 
evidence showed that women in hourly positions made, on average, $1,100 
per year less than men.55  In salaried management positions, the average 
difference was $14,500.56  This inequity had developed even though the 
women had, on average, greater seniority and higher performance ratings.57  
The plaintiffs further alleged that Wal-Mart’s female employees had been 
 48. See id.; see also Williams, supra note 23, at 426–39. 
 49. MARY C. STILL, CTR. FOR WORKLIFE LAW, UNIV. OF CAL. HASTINGS COLL. OF LAW, 
LITIGATING THE MATERNAL WALL:  U.S. LAWSUITS CHARGING DISCRIMINATION AGAINST 
WORKERS WITH FAMILY RESPONSIBILITIES 7 (2006), available at 
http://www.uchastings.edu/site_files/WLL/FRDreport.pdf. 
 50. See, e.g., Catherine Albiston, Kathryn Burkett Dickson, Charlotte Fishman & Leslie 
F. Levy, Ten Lessons for Practitioners About Family Responsibilities Discrimination and 
Stereotyping Evidence, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1285, 1302–04 (2008). 
 51. 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal. 2004), aff’d, 509 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2007), reh’g en 
banc granted, Nos. 04-16688, 04-16720, 2009 WL 365818 (9th Cir. Feb. 13, 2009). 
 52. Disparate impact claims challenge facially neutral policies that have a negative 
impact on a protected class of employees and that cannot be justified as necessary for the 
operation of the business. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2006); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 
401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).  Disparate treatment claims challenge employer conduct as 
intentionally discriminatory. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431. 
 53. See Hart, supra note 7, at 781–88. 
 54. See Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification and Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities at 1, Dukes, 222 F.R.D. 137 (No. C01-02252 MJJ) [hereinafter Plaintiff’s Motion 
for Class Certification]. 
 55. Id. at 25. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 141. 
  
2009] A MATTER OF CONTEXT 49 
 
promoted to management less often than comparable male employees, and 
that those women who were promoted had to wait longer for promotion 
than their male peers.58  The evidence they presented showed that, in 2001, 
67% of all hourly workers and 78% of hourly department managers were 
women.59  By contrast, only 35.7% of assistant managers, 14.3% of store 
managers, and 9.8% of district managers were female.60  The explanation 
for these inequalities, plaintiffs argued, was that Wal-Mart had adopted a 
system for pay and promotion decisions that permitted unguided and 
excessive subjectivity and thus allowed bias to infect the process.61  
Whether viewed as facially neutral (and thus challenged under disparate 
impact) or as intentionally discriminatory (challenged as disparate 
treatment), the use of excessively subjective decision making in setting pay 
and awarding promotions presents a clear example of a policy whose 
impact can be made clearer to a fact finder by a social science expert who 
can explain the psychological and social relationship between subjectivity 
and stereotyping.  First, however, the across-the-board decision to permit 
unguided subjectivity in personnel decisions needs to be explained as a 
policy (rather than as simply the absence of any policy), and that is the 
question at issue in the class certification dispute. 
In Dukes and other similar cases,62 employers seeking to avoid class 
litigation have argued that there is no common question linking the 
challenges presented by thousands of women denied promotions and equal 
pay.63  Social framework testimony has been introduced to explain how 
certain employer policies operate to introduce the requisite commonality.  
So, for example, when faced with a nationwide challenge to pay and 
promotion policies, Wal-Mart’s principal line of defense was to argue that 
the class could not be certified because there was no evidence that the same 
corporate policy was affecting all class members.64  Part of the plaintiffs’ 
response to this assertion was the testimony of Dr. William Bielby, an 
organizational psychologist.  Dr. Bielby is an expert in organizational 
behavior and personnel practices.65  His report identified the organizational 
 58. Id. at 141, 146. 
 59. Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification, supra note 54, at 7. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 19. 
 62. See, e.g., Palmer v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 217 F.R.D. 430 (N.D. Ill. 2003); 
Beckmann v. CBS, Inc., 192 F.R.D. 608 (D. Minn. 2000); Butler v. Home Depot, Inc., 70 
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 51 (N.D. Cal. 1996); Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 803 F. 
Supp. 259 (N.D. Cal. 1992); Complaint, Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 240 F.R.D. 627 
(N.D. Cal. 2007) (No. C 04-03341 MHP); see also Tristin K. Green, Targeting Workplace 
Context:  Title VII as a Tool for Institutional Reform, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 659, 682–87 
(2003) (describing a number of similar cases). 
 63. See Hart, supra note 7, at 779–81. 
 64. See Melissa Hart, Learning from Wal-Mart, 10 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 355, 380–
81 (2007). 
 65. Declaration of William T. Bielby, Ph.D in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class 
Certification at 3, Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal. 2004), aff’d, 
509 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2007), reh’g en banc granted, Nos. 04-16688, 04-16720, 2009 WL 
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structures and policies in place at Wal-Mart—including excessive 
subjectivity in promotion and pay decisions, nonposting of promotion and 
training opportunities, failure to review promotion and pay patterns—that 
were potentially affecting every plaintiff at the retail giant and that have 
been shown in the field of organizational psychology to be more likely to 
permit the intrusion of bias and stereotyping into decision making.66 
The district court judge evaluating the standards for class certification in 
Dukes accepted Dr. Bielby’s report as one of the pieces of evidence that 
supported the showing of commonality.67  Other courts have similarly 
accepted the social framework evidence offered by plaintiffs and have 
relied on it as part of the rationale for class certification.68  In some cases, 
however, courts have rejected the proffered expert testimony and have 
declined to certify the class.69 
Given that certification of a class often effectively ends the litigation in 
large employment discrimination disputes, the impact of this testimony 
cannot be underestimated.  In general, after a class is certified, the pressure 
on the employer to settle the dispute, rather than litigate a costly, time-
consuming, and potentially embarrassing suit against a large group of 
employees, is substantial.  So, as a practical matter, class certification 
operates as a kind of victory on the merits.  By contrast, when a class is not 
certified, it is rare that many of the individual employees who were willing 
to be members of the class will pursue their own claims.  The costs and 
risks to an individual of pursuing litigation are sufficiently serious that even 
a plaintiff with a very serious claim of discrimination might not feel able to 
pursue it on her own.70  Denial of certification thus also acts as a kind of 
merits decision.  It is no surprise then, as discussed further below, that the 
admissibility of social framework expert testimony is a hotly contested 
issue in class certification debates. 
365818 (9th Cir. Feb. 13, 2009) (No. C-01-2252 MJJ) [hereinafter Declaration of William T. 
Bielby, Ph.D]. 
 66. See Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 151–55. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See, e.g., Nelson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 245 F.R.D. 358, 368–70 (E.D. Ark. 
2007); Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 240 F.R.D. 627, 638–40 (N.D. Cal. 2007); 
McReynolds v. Sodexho Marriott Servs., Inc., 208 F.R.D. 428, 441–44 (D.D.C. 2002); 
Butler v. Home Depot, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 1257, 1262–65 (N.D. Cal. 1997); Stender v. Lucky 
Stores, Inc., 803 F. Supp. 259, 327 (N.D. Cal. 1992); see also EEOC v. Morgan Stanley & 
Co., 324 F. Supp. 2d 451, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Bielby may properly testify about gender 
stereotypes, and about how these stereotypes may have affected decisions at Morgan 
Stanley.”). 
 69. See, e.g., Serrano v. Cintas Corp., Nos. 04-40132, 06-12311, 2009 WL 910702, at 
*6–7 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2009); Puffer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 255 F.R.D. 450, 473–74 (N.D. 
Ill. 2009); see also Gutierrez v. Johnson & Johnson, 467 F. Supp. 2d. 403, 410–13 (D.N.J. 
2006) (declining to certify class after finding that plaintiffs did not demonstrate commonality 
and noting that they had not provided an expert who could identify a common policy). 
 70. See, e.g., Nantiya Ruan, Bringing Sense to Incentives:  An Examination of Incentive 
Payments to Named Plaintiffs in Employment Discrimination Class Actions, 10 EMP. RTS. & 
EMP. POL’Y J. 395 (2006). 
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C.  The Appropriate Scope of Framework Testimony 
Defendants challenging social framework expert witnesses in litigation 
regularly make several arguments.  First, they argue that the evidence 
cannot truly be helpful to the jury and that it is likely to be more prejudicial 
than probative.71  In the context of employment discrimination litigation, 
defendants have argued as well that there is not unanimity in the social 
sciences about stereotyping research and that this lack of consensus should 
preclude introduction of framework evidence;72 that laboratory studies 
cannot be generalized to the workplace;73 and that the proffered expert did 
not conduct empirical studies and cannot quantify how much stereotyping 
actually influenced decisions in a particular workplace.74 
These criticisms of social framework evidence do not withstand much 
scrutiny.  The Federal Rules of Evidence do not require unanimity in a field 
to permit introduction of expert testimony in litigation.75  Moreover, there 
is in fact a substantial agreement among scientists about the operation of 
cognitive processes like bias and stereotyping.76  Over the past few 
decades, researchers have conducted hundreds of studies and published 
hundreds of articles demonstrating the ways that decisions in a variety of 
contexts are affected by cognitive processes like stereotyping and bias.  
“[I]n keeping with principles of good science, researchers have utilized 
 71. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 255–56 (1989) (noting that the 
evidence of stereotyping in this case might have been so apparent from the comments made 
that an expert witness might not have been able to offer anything the jury could not have 
seen for itself); Ray v. Miller Meester Adver., Inc., 664 N.W.2d. 355, 366 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2003) (excluding testimony on the grounds that the jury could have reached the same 
conclusion on its own); Vidmar & Schuller, supra note 11, at 138 (discussing the usefulness 
of social framework evidence to the jury). 
 72. See, e.g., William T. Bielby, Can I Get a Witness?  Challenges of Using Expert 
Testimony on Cognitive Bias in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. 
POL’Y J. 377 (2003) (describing instances of this argument). 
 73. See, e.g., Ellis, 240 F.R.D. at 650; see also Frank J. Landy, The Tenuous Bridge 
Between Research and Reality:  The Importance of Research Design in Inferences 
Regarding Work Behavior, in BEYOND COMMON SENSE:  PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE IN THE 
COURTROOM 341 (Eugene Borgida & Susan T. Fiske eds., 2008) [hereinafter The Tenuous 
Bridge Between Research and Reality]; Bielby, supra note 72, at 387–88. 
 74. See, e.g., Int’l Healthcare Exch., Inc. v. Global Healthcare Exch., LLC, 470 F. Supp. 
2d 345, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Arnold v. Cargill Inc., No. 01-2086 (DWF/AJB), 2006 WL 
1716221, at *7 (D. Minn. June 20, 2006). 
 75. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).  Indeed, the 
advisory committee’s note to Rule 702 specifically observes that “[t]he amendment is broad 
enough to permit testimony that is the product of competing principles or methods in the 
same field of expertise.”  FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note; see also infra Part 
III.B. 
 76. See, e.g., John T. Jost et al., The Existence of Implicit Bias Is Beyond Reasonable 
Doubt:  A Refutation of Ideological and Methodological Objections and Executive Summary 
of Ten Studies That No Manager Should Ignore, in RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL 
BEHAVIOR (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 8, on file with authors); see also On the Use of 
Gender Stereotyping Research, supra note 13, at 615 (“Several reviews of the scientific 
literature on gender stereotyping suggest that this body of knowledge reflects a scientifically 
established and mature area of psychological science with areas of scientific agreement and 
disagreement that provide evidence-based insights into the nature of gender relations.”). 
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multiple methods to rule out limitations of specific measurement tools and 
to generalize findings across many tools.”77 The broad agreement within 
the field is the consequence of “nearly a hundred years of cognitive 
psychology and more than three decades of paradigm-shifting research from 
dozens of the most well respected social psychological laborato
orld.”78 
As to defendants’ claims that experts should not be permitted to apply 
research results obtained in laboratory or other controlled studies in 
evaluating the operation of cognitive processes in the workplace, that is a 
concern that goes to the weight a fact finder should place on the evidence, 
not to whether the evidence is admissible in the first instance.79  Finally, 
defendants sometimes complain that the expert cannot quantify the specific 
amount of or consequences of stereotyping in a particular workplace.80  But 
this kind of quantification is not what the social framework expert is even 
purporting to have an expertise about.  The testimony is being offered not to 
prove discrimination in a particular case or cases—that determination is one 
the fact finder will make in light of all of the evidence—but to offer a 
backdrop of information about how the phenomenon of stereotyping 
operates so th
formation. 
Many of these challenges to the presentation of social framework 
testimony circle around the question of what exact purposes the information 
is being offered to serve.  Of particular concern is the broad question of 
whether the expert is asserting—or will be taken by the jury to be 
asserting—that particular decisions were in fact discriminatory.  A more 
specific iteration of this debate comes up as a question about whether the 
social framework expert should be permitted to provide testimony not only 
about stereotyping as a general social phenomenon, but also about whether 
the policies and practices in a particular workplace are more or less likely to 
permit the operation of stereotyping into the decisional process.  It is this 
argument
say.81 
These authors argue that experts offering social framework testimony 
should not be permitted to comment at all on the existing practices in a 
 77. Faigman et al., supra note 4, at 1410. 
 78. Jost et al., supra note 76 (manuscript at 8). 
 79. See, e.g., Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 240 F.R.D. 627, 649 (N.D. Cal. 2007). 
 80. Cf. Joan Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797, 818–19 (1989) 
(discussing Judge John A. Nordberg’s demand for quantification of stereotype evidence in 
EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.) (“Nordberg’s insistence on quantification in effect required 
plaintiffs to specify the precise percentage of women interested in nontraditional jobs such as 
commission sales.  By not requiring Sears to provide equivalent proof of the specific 
percentage of women who fit gender stereotypes, the Sears district court opinion in effect 
establishes a legal presumption that all women fit traditional gender stereotypes.” (citing 
EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302, 320–21 (7th Cir. 1988))). 
 81. See generally Contextual Evidence of Gender Discrimination, supra note 2. 
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for Dr. William Bielby, testifying in Dukes,82 to have reviewed Wal-Mart’s 
corporate policies and other information about circumstances at the 
company and to offer opinions about whether Wal-Mart’s policies were 
structured in ways that would tend to limit or tend to permit the operation of 
stereotype and bias.83  Instead, Monahan, Walker, and Mitchell contend 
that a social framework expert may only present the results of general 
studies available within his field.  If a party in litigation wishes to have an 
expert draw any connection between the general research and any facts in 
the particular case, these authors assert, the expert must do an expensive, 
time-consuming, and particularized study of the specific workplace.84  On 
this view, the only way a social scientist testifying in an employment 
discrimination class action could offer opinions about particular workplace 
policies would be to “conduct an audit study (in which persons of different 
sexes with matching qualifications pose as applicants for the same job), a 
controlled experiment into the effects of stereotyping on managerial 
decisions at [an employer], or an objective observational study of 
conditions at [an employer].”85  Putting aside the serious questions about 
the likelihood that an employer would consent to such a study and the 
validity of a study done in a specific workplace while litigation over 
discrimination in that workplace was pending, this kind of empirical study 
is not required either by applicable social science standards or by relevant 
evidentiary rules. 
The empirical requirement that Monahan, Walker, and Mitchell seek to 
impose on social scientific expert testimony in this context is at odds with 
the views of numerous psychologists and sociologists.86  Psychologists 
Susan Fiske and Eugene Borgida, for example, explain that:  “[t]he social 
framework approach helps educate fact-finders about the conditions under 
which gender stereotypes and prejudice are likely to influence impressions, 
evaluations, and behavior in social and organizational settings.”87  Central 
to their understanding of social framework testimony is that an important 
part of what the social science expert is able to offer is an evaluation of the 
policies and practices operating at a particular workplace, measured against 
what the current research into organizational behavior and psychology have 
 82. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 151–54 (N.D. Cal. 2004), aff’d, 509 
F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2007), reh’g en banc granted, Nos. 04-16688, 04-16720, 2009 WL 
365818 (9th Cir. Feb. 13, 2009). 
 83. See Contextual Evidence of Gender Discrimination, supra note 2, at 1742–48. 
 84. Id. at 1749. 
 85. Id. at 1747. 
 86. See, e.g., On the Use of Gender Stereotyping Research, supra note 13; Susan T. 
Fiske & Eugene Borgida, Social Framework Analysis as Expert Testimony in Sexual 
Harassment Suits, in SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE:  PROCEEDINGS OF NEW 
YORK UNIVERSITY 51ST ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 575 (Samuel Estreicher ed., 1999); 
Goodman & Croyle, supra note 6, at 232–33. 
 87. Fiske & Borgida, supra note 86, at 579. 
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taught scientists about decisionmaking processes and outcomes.88  This 
evaluation can be undertaken by examining the policies and practices in the 
workplace as described in litigation materials (including written workplace 
policies and the depositions of managers who apply them).  As described by 
Dr. Bielby, 
the expert reviews testimony, documents, and other quantitative and 
qualitative information about a case in order to draw conclusions about 
how extant social science theory and research applies to the specific 
circumstances of the organizational setting where discrimination is 
alleged to have occurred.  She or he analyzes the specific features of the 
organization’s policies and practices and evaluates them against what that 
social science scholarship has shown to be factors that create and sustain 
bias and those that minimize bias.89 
 This understanding of social framework analysis sees the expertise as 
involving two data sets that are examined by the expert.  The first is the 
extensive body of research in empirical social psychology, widely accepted 
by the scientific community.90  This research addresses the prevalence of 
stereotyping and subtle bias in decision making in our society.91  The 
second data set available to the expert is the “rich range of empirical 
materials that would otherwise be inaccessible to academic scholars” but 
that the litigation context makes available.92  Discovery can give the expert 
access to all of the employer’s written policies, to the statistical information 
in the employer’s personnel database, and to deposition testimony from a 
witness speaking on the company’s behalf under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 30(b)(6) or other knowledgeable employees about how they 
understand the company’s written and unwritten policies.  Ultimately, “the 
richness and level of detail regarding an organization’s policy, practice, and 
decision-making contained in the testimony, documents, and statistics 
generated through discovery in class action discrimination litigation far 
exceed what would ever be accessible to a social scientist conducting a 
substantive organizational case study.”93 
 88. See, e.g., Margaret Bull Kovera & Eugene Borgida, Social Psychology and Law, in 
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 90–92, on file with 
authors). 
 89. Bielby, supra note 72, at 390. 
 90. See, e.g., On the Use of Gender Stereotyping Research, supra note 13, at 615. 
 91. See id. 
 92. Bielby, supra note 72, at 390. 
 93. Id. at 391.  In a response to this essay, Mitchell, Monahan, and Walker reject the 
utility of litigation materials as a data set for evaluating company policies. See John 
Monahan, Laurens Walker & Gregory Mitchell, The Limits of Social Framework Evidence, 
LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK (forthcoming) (manuscript at 12), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1421235.  Their argument that discovery 
may create an incomplete data set, however, misses the point.  While discovery materials 
may not provide an evaluating expert with every piece of information about employer 
practice or policy, the rules of discovery do place obligations on the parties to make 
complete disclosures, and plaintiff employees are entitled to rely on defendants’ discovery 
responses as information for expert analysis.  An expert can reasonably assume that 
workplace practices and policies are what the employer says they are.  Moreover, the 
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Of course, this does not mean that the social framework expert can 
necessarily offer any expert judgment about specific causation; the question 
of whether discrimination in fact led to the denial of specific promotions of 
women at Wal-Mart, for example, is one that will ultimately be answered 
by the fact finder.  As discussed in more detail below,94 the risk presented 
by testimony from a social scientist on the specific causation question is 
that the assessment that is called for may well fall outside of the proffered 
expert’s field of expertise.95  What the social framework expert is doing is 
looking at the policies and practices operating in a workplace more 
generally and identifying the ways in which they may limit or permit 
operation of stereotype and bias.  To say that some forms of “linkage”—the 
link to specific causation—are beyond the scope of a social scientist’s 
expertise is very different from saying that a social scientist is engaging in 
impermissible “linkage” whenever he or she evaluates specific workplace 
policies and practices in light of current social science literature.96 
This dispute over whether a social framework expert can evaluate the 
policies and practices in a particular workplace goes right to the heart of 
how social science expertise has been used in employment discrimination 
litigation and, particularly, in class action disputes.  As Part II.B discusses, 
social framework experts have testified in a wide variety of cases, and their 
testimony has consistently included application of social science research to 
an evaluation of the challenged workplace policies.  Thus, what Monahan, 
Walker, and Mitchell frame as a debate simply over how social framework 
evidence should be admitted is in fact a dispute over whether it should be 
admitted at all. 
II.  THE WEAKNESS OF A CATEGORICAL ARGUMENT FOR EXCLUSION OF 
SOCIAL FRAMEWORKS 
Attacks on the use of social framework evidence in employment 
discrimination class actions, generally echoing arguments presented by 
defendants to the courts considering the admissibility of plaintiffs’ expert 
potential flaws in a data set created by empirical testing of a workplace undertaken during 
the course of litigation are much more significant. 
 94. See infra Part III.A. 
 95. See, e.g., Faigman et al., supra note 4, at 1432 (noting that the applicable science 
may not “permit an expert to say with confidence whether a given case is an instance of [a] 
general finding”). 
 96. In their response to this essay, Mitchell, Monahan, and Walker make much of the 
final sentence in Dr. Bielby’s expert report. Monahan et al., supra note 93 (manuscript at 7–
8).  The last sentence of Dr. Bielby’s forty-one-page report expresses his view that Wal-
Mart’s policies “contribute to disparities between men and women in their compensation and 
career trajectories at the company.” Declaration of William T. Bielby, Ph.D, supra note 65, 
at 41.  This statement is a slender reed on which to hang an indictment of the social 
framework testimony offered in Dukes.  Whether Dr. Bielby’s assessment is characterized as 
an opinion on specific causation that goes beyond his expertise or not (and there is ample 
room for debate on that point), it is one thing to question a sentence in, or portion of, an 
expert report and quite another to create a categorical exclusion of any expert testimony that 
applies social science knowledge to examine specific workplace policies. 
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witnesses, have begun to appear on the pages of law reviews.97  The 
arguments against admissibility of social framework testimony go hand-in-
hand with the very aggressive challenge being made to one of the core 
claims of social framework evidence in employment litigation—the notion 
that stereotyping and bias continue to influence workplace decisions, often 
in subtle and structural ways. 
The claim that experts offering social framework testimony cannot 
appropriately examine the policies in a particular workplace is among these 
attacks.  In their recent essay, Monahan, Walker, and Mitchell assert that 
“experts presenting social frameworks should be prohibited from providing 
any linkage to the case at hand, leaving application (or not) of the general 
research findings entirely to the fact-finder.”98  The authors specifically 
attack the testimony offered by Dr. William Bielby in the Dukes class 
action certification dispute,99 and they argue more generally for an 
approach to social framework expert testimony that would call for the 
exclusion of all or nearly all of the framework testimony that has been 
offered in employment discrimination cases in the past two decades. 
As Part II.A discusses, Walker and Monahan were the first legal scholars 
to use the term “social framework” to “capture the similarities among 
certain types of social science evidence.”100  In Contextual Evidence of 
Gender Discrimination, the two, together with their coauthor, seem to 
suggest that their coining of this phrase gives them a unique right to define 
the terms and content of expert testimony offered in employment 
discrimination cases to provide a social framework for evaluating 
workplace policies.101  They criticize Dr. Bielby (among others) for 
“depart[ing] from our conception of a social framework and exceed[ing] the 
limits on expert framework testimony proposed above” as if the departure 
from their perspective itself rendered his testimony invalid.102  There is no 
justification for awarding that kind of special authority to decide the proper 
scope of the science.  What is now commonly referred to as social 
framework evidence had been offered long before these authors used the 
 97. See, e.g., Allan G. King & Syeeda S. Amin, Social Framework Analysis as 
Inadmissible “Character” Evidence, 32 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 1 (2008); Contextual 
Evidence of Gender Discrimination, supra note 2. 
 98. Contextual Evidence of Gender Discrimination, supra note 2, at 1734. 
 99. Id. at 1742–48. 
 100. Vidmar & Schuller, supra note 11, at 134; see supra Part I.A. 
 101. See, e.g., Contextual Evidence of Gender Discrimination, supra note 2, at 1719 
(describing the testimony of Dr. Bielby as “exceed[ing] the limitations on expert testimony 
[in this area] established . . . by both the original and revised proposal of what constitutes 
‘social framework’ evidence”); id. at 1745 (“Dr. Bielby’s testimony in Dukes departs from 
our conception of a social framework . . . .”). 
 102. Id. at 1745.  If Dr. Bielby, or others, had relied on a specific methodology or 
definition offered by Professors Monahan and Walker, and then instead used a different 
methodology, this criticism might be warranted.  However, Dr. Bielby, like many others, 
cites Monahan and Walker for the term “social framework analysis,” but provides his own 
definition and explanation of what his social framework will involve. See Declaration of 
William T. Bielby, Ph.D, supra note 65, at 5 & n.1. 
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particular term to describe it.103 Moreover, the value of the expertise 
offered by social framework evidence is not in its name, but in its content.  
Once their claim for special authority to define social framework testimony 
is discarded, the argument presented by the authors of Contextual Evidence 
of Gender Discrimination is simply an assertion that courts and other 
academics taking a particular approach to admissibility of social science 
research are incorrect.  For that assertion, the essay provides little concrete 
support.  Instead, their argument seems to be a circular reliance on the 
category names—social framework and social fact—that they have 
previously used to label social science expert testimony.104 
Dr. Bielby’s testimony in Dukes involved a review and presentation of 
extensive, well-regarded and generally accepted research into the operation 
of stereotype and bias in decision making.105  In addition to that review of 
the general research, Dr. Bielby reviewed the depositions of Wal-Mart 
managers and employees, along with extensive information offered by Wal-
Mart about its corporate policies.106  His report identifies the policies and 
practices that Wal-Mart used that have been found through social science 
research to permit, rather than limit, the operation of sex stereotype and 
bias.107  Monahan, Mitchell, and Walker assert that this is not actually 
social framework analysis.  Their assertion rests on their definition of 
framework analysis, which they conclude cannot include any reference to 
the workplace policies and practices at issue in a particular case.  Instead, 
they conclude, because he does evaluate Wal-Mart’s employment practices, 
Dr. Bielby is engaged in social fact analysis, which they define as social 
science research done specifically to prove a fact in a particular case.108  
And, they conclude, because he is doing social fact analysis, he should have 
been required to conduct extensive and expensive case-specific research of 
individual worksites and employees at Wal-Mart, rather than examining the 
policies and practices that Wal-Mart had identified as those employed 
within the company.109 
The categories that these authors use to challenge Dr. Bielby’s admission 
as an expert are not social science categories.  They are categories created 
by a few lawyers trying to describe observed phenomena in litigation.  They 
offer one way to delineate types of social science expert testimony, but it is 
certainly not the only way.  In fact, as the authors of Contextual Evidence of 
Gender Discrimination acknowledge only briefly in a footnote at the end of 
 103. See, e.g., Vidmar & Schuller, supra note 11, at 133 (describing the increasing use of 
social science evidence over the preceding “decade and a half” to provide social and 
psychological context for disputes and noting that Monahan and Walker had “given the 
generic label of ‘social framework evidence’” to this particular use of social science 
evidence). 
 104. See supra Part I.A. 
 105. See Declaration of William T. Bielby, Ph.D, supra note 65, at 15–21. 
 106. Id. 21–24. 
 107. Id. 24–30. 
 108. Contextual Evidence of Gender Discrimination, supra note 2, at 1746–48. 
 109. Id. at 1747–48. 
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their essay,110 other social scientists and lawyers describe the contours of 
social framework testimony quite differently.  The important point is not 
what label the testimony has, but whether its contents meet the 
requirements of the Federal Rules of Evidence for admissibility of expert 
testimony. 
This section examines and critiques the arguments made in support of the 
elimination of social framework expert testimony. Allowing social 
framework experts to give their opinions as to the relationship between the 
general research in their fields and the policies adopted by a particular 
employer is entirely consistent with Rule 702.  Moreover, there is nothing 
in Contextual Evidence of Gender Discrimination itself, or in any Supreme 
Court or lower federal court precedent, to support the authors’ novel view 
that appellate courts should act as fact finders in the social framework 
context. 
A.  Social Framework Testimony May Be Both Relevant and Reliable in 
Employment Discrimination Class Certification Decisions and  
Rule 702 Does Not Permit Categorical Rules of Exclusion 
Whether an expert witness offering social framework testimony should 
be admitted in a particular employment discrimination dispute is a question 
of evidence law that requires the district court to perform the “gatekeeping” 
function envisioned by the Federal Rules of Evidence.111  Specifically, a 
district court must determine whether the proffered testimony meets the 
standards of Rule 702, which provides, 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier 
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if 
(1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony 
is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has 
applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.112 
 In Contextual Evidence of Gender Discrimination, the authors assert that 
permitting social science experts to provide “linkage” between “general 
research—that is, research that did not involve the parties in the case before 
the court”—and specific facts in the case would violate Rule 702 because 
the expert testimony would not be based on “sufficient facts or data” as 
required by the rule.113  Their criticism is that an expert who evaluated an 
employer’s policies and practices in light of the available social science 
research without doing an extensive and expensive workplace-specific 
study would simply be offering an unscientific opinion.  This criticism is 
 110. See id. at 1746 n.84. 
 111. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993). 
 112. FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 113. Contextual Evidence of Gender Discrimination, supra note 2, at 1734 (footnotes 
omitted). 
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based on their view that “general research findings cannot be linked by an 
expert witness to the facts of a specific case.”114 
The categorical exclusion that Monahan, Walker, and Mitchell propose is 
contrary to the general presumption in favor of admissibility under the 
Federal Rules of Evidence.115  The proposal ignores the oft-recognized 
appropriateness of expert opinion testimony and disregards the district 
court’s well-settled role as gatekeeper in individual disputes.  Their 
argument also disregards the fit between social science expertise like that 
offered by Dr. Bielby and the specific questions being considered at the 
class certification stage of employment litigation. 
1.  Rule 702 Is Flexible and Not Subject to Categorical Exclusions 
Over the past decade and a half, the Supreme Court has considered Rule 
702 on several occasions, and its consistent message has been a focus on 
the permissive and flexible nature of the Federal Rules of Evidence and the 
wide latitude that courts should give qualified experts.  In 1993, the Court 
discarded the long-standing and restrictive “Frye Test” for admission of 
expert testimony,116 which had for several decades conditioned 
admissibility of the proffered evidence on “general acceptance” in the 
particular field.117  Rejecting this standard, the Court instead focused on the 
district court’s role as a gatekeeper, responsible for ensuring that experts 
offer testimony that is both reliable and relevant.  In Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,118 the Court observed that “[t]he inquiry 
envisioned by Rule 702 is . . . a flexible one.”119  The categorical exclusion 
proposed in Contextual Evidence of Gender Discrimination is 
fundamentally at odds with these standards. 
 114. Id. at 1718. 
 115. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587 (The “basic standard of relevance . . . is a liberal one.”).  
While Rule 702 was amended in 2000 to formalize aspects of the Daubert decision, the 
amendment drafters and the courts continued to regard the admissibility standard to be 
permissive. See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note (“[R]ejection of expert 
testimony is the exception rather than the rule.”); see also Pineda v. Ford Motor Co., 520 
F.3d 237, 243 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting that Rule 702 declares a liberal standard of 
admissibility); KSP Invs., Inc. v. United States, No. 1:07-CV-857, 2008 WL 182257, at *1 
(N.D. Ohio Jan. 17, 2008) (citing 4 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, 
WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 702.02, at 702–06 (2d ed. 2009)) (noting presumption of 
admissibility of expert testimony); Matrix Oncology, L.P. v. Priority Healthcare Corp., No.  
4:05-CV-693-Y, 2007 WL 4462247, at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 30, 2007) (“Expert testimony is 
presumed admissible.”). 
 116. The test drew its name from the decision in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 
(D.C. Cir. 1923). 
 117. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589. 
 118. 509 U.S. 579. 
 119. Id. at 594.  Thus, while Daubert set forth several factors a court might consider in 
evaluating the admissibility of expert testimony (including empirical testability, whether the 
theory has been published or otherwise subject to peer review, whether the known or 
potential error rate is acceptable, and whether the method is generally accepted in the field), 
the opinion emphasized that even that list of factors was not exhaustive and might not be 
applicable in every instance. See id. at 593–95. 
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2.  Expert Testimony May Properly Include Opinions on Facts at Issue in 
the Particular Case 
Moreover, the proposed exclusion is based on the authors’ apparent view 
that a social science expert should not be permitted to offer opinions about 
specific policies or practices in a workplace that he evaluates in light of his 
knowledge in his field of expertise.  This broad rejection of opinion 
testimony is entirely inconsistent with an expert’s “wide latitude to offer 
opinions, including those that are not based on firsthand knowledge or 
observation.”120  In General Electric Co. v. Joiner,121 for example, the 
Court specifically referenced the possibility that an expert might “link” 
general research data to the facts in a particular case,122 noting that  
“[t]rained experts commonly extrapolate from existing data.”123  Indeed, 
[e]xperts of all kinds tie observations to conclusions through the use of 
what Judge Learned Hand called ‘general truths derived from . . . 
specialized experience.’  And whether the specific expert testimony 
focuses upon specialized observations, the specialized translation of those 
observations into theory, a specialized theory itself, or the application of 
such a theory in a particular case, the expert’s testimony often will rest 
‘upon an experience confessedly foreign in kind to [the jury’s] own.’124 
 The Court’s interpretation in this and other cases is consistent with the 
approach taken in the advisory committee’s note to Rule 702, which makes 
clear that expert testimony can include either general statements concerning 
a particular area of knowledge, opinions about the application of that 
knowledge to the facts of the particular case, or both.  The advisory 
committee’s note starts with the observation that “[m]ost of the literature 
assumes that experts testify only in the form of opinions.”125  Of course, the 
advisory committee’s note also recognizes “that an expert on the stand may 
give a dissertation or exposition of scientific or other principles relevant to 
the case, leaving the trier of fact to apply them to the facts.”126  What is key 
in both the advisory committee’s comments and in the Court’s decisions on 
Rule 702 is that the district court holds considerable discretion to make a 
decision about the relevance and reliability of the evidence in the particular 
dispute.127  Moreover, appellate review of the decisions made by district 
courts should be, in this instance, as in other evidentiary matters, reviewed 
only for abuse of discretion.128 
 120. Id. at 592. 
 121. 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
 122. Id. at 146–47. 
 123. Id. at 146. 
 124. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 148–49 (1999) (quoting Learned 
Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 HARV. L. 
REV. 40, 54 (1901)). 
 125. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note. 
 126. Id. (emphasis added). 
 127. See Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 141–42. 
 128. See infra Part II.B. 
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Lower courts applying the standards explicated by the Supreme Court 
have often admitted expert opinion testimony in which a witness’s career 
experience of studying or working in a subject area is applied to the facts of 
a case.  For example, in United States v. Hammoud,129 the court admitted 
the testimony of an expert in terrorist organizations “to testify that 
Hammoud was the leader of a Hizballah cell.”130  The witness “testified 
that his expertise regarding Hizballah derived from his previous experience 
with the FBI and his current employment with a think tank, at which he 
specialized in Middle Eastern terrorist groups.”131  He allowed that the 
process was “not scientific research,”132 but rather the application of facts 
presented by the government against facts already known from his 
experience as an analyst:  “the best way to go about making sense of 
something in the social sciences is to collect as much information as 
possible and to balance each new incoming piece of information against the 
body of information that you’ve built to that point.”133 
Similarly, in Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,134 the district court 
permitted the introduction of an expert in Internet use and marketing to 
offer testimony as to the ways that people browse on the Internet.135  The 
court rejected Wal-Mart’s argument that the plaintiff’s proffered expert was 
required to conduct his own independent study of the websites at issue.136  
Instead, the judge concluded that the expert could apply his expertise in the 
field more generally to offer opinions about what was more or less likely to 
be occurring in the particular disputed circumstances.137 
Of course, expert testimony lacking in a method—founded on “expert 
intuition” alone—has no place under Rule 702.  If an expert declines to use 
well-established methodologies within a field without explanation,138 or if 
the expert’s approach is in conflict with the standards in the field or lacks 
supporting research in the field, a district court may well exercise its 
discretion in evaluating the requirements of Rule 702 and exclude the 
expert testimony.  What the Supreme Court decisions, as well as numerous 
opinions from the lower courts,139 demonstrate is that the admissibility of 
 129. 381 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc), vacated, 543 U.S. 1097 (2005).  The 
decision was vacated by the U.S. Supreme Court on a sentencing issue, in light of United 
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), but the en banc court on remand adopted the original 
opinion so far as it affirmed the conviction.  United States v. Hammoud, 405 F.3d 1034, 
1034 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 130. Hammoud, 381 F.3d at 336. 
 131. Id. at 337. 
 132. Id.; see also FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note (“Some types of expert 
testimony will not rely on anything like a scientific method . . . .”). 
 133. Hammoud, 381 F.3d at 337. 
 134. 537 F. Supp. 2d 1302 (N.D. Ga. 2008). 
 135. Id. at 1325. 
 136. Id. at 1324–25. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. WH-TV Broad. Corp., 395 F.3d 416, 419 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 139. See, e.g., Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief and Dev., 549 F.3d 685, 705 (7th Cir. 
2008) (admitting expert testimony that two figures who shot plaintiff were members of 
Hamas); In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (“MTBE”) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. M21-88, 2008 
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expert opinion testimony linking a field of knowledge with the case facts is 
an open domain, sensitive to the circumstances. 
3.  Expert Opinion on the Policies at a Particular Workplace Can Be Both 
Relevant and Reliable in Class Certification Disputes 
Applying these standards to expert testimony offered in class certification 
disputes in employment litigation, district courts are well within their 
discretion to admit social framework expertise that addresses the general 
research on organizational behavior and social cognition theory and that 
also examines and offers opinions on the policies and practices in operation 
in the particular workplace. 
The question that ultimately must be answered in evaluating the 
admissibility of this expert testimony is whether it “fit[s],” both with the 
relevant scientific discipline and with the legal issue to which it is 
directed.140  In their recent article, Faigman, Dasgupta, and Ridgeway made 
a strong case for the validity of expert testimony describing the general 
research findings on stereotype and bias, but they concluded that a social 
scientist in an individual employment discrimination dispute cannot “state 
whether the same research findings definitively explain a specific 
employer’s decisions in a specific circumstance.”141  The reason for the 
distinction is that the existing research on bias does not, as a matter of 
science, support expert conclusions about whether a particular decision was 
an instance of bias.142  Significantly, however, Dr. Bielby and other similar 
experts in class certification disputes are not offering opinions as to specific 
employment decisions and whether they were in fact infected by bias.  
Instead, Dr. Bielby’s testimony in Dukes involved the identification of 
policies in place at Wal-Mart and consideration of whether available 
WL 1971538, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2008) (while “Reynolds does not use social science 
methodologies such as regression analysis or econometrics,” he might instead “appl[y] his 
extensive experience in ethanol production and distribution logistics to analyze an array of 
facts”); United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 553 F. Supp. 2d 121, 125–26 (D. Conn. 2008) 
(admitting expert opinion testimony about al Qaeda operations and mujahideen activities in 
Europe and Asia and noting that the expert “testified that he applies to his expert testimony 
the same social science methodologies that he learned at Georgetown University and that are 
applied to other subjects that cannot be tested scientifically”); Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. 
Rambus Inc., Nos. CV-00-20905 RMW, C-05-00334 RMW, 2008 WL 413743, at *1–2 
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2008) (witness testified about his experience in engineering and business 
regarding what a reasonable engineer in the industry would have known in the 1990s) 
(“Reviewing contemporaneous documents appears to be one of the more reliable methods of 
reconstructing what someone may have known during a specific time period”); United States 
v. Paracha, No. 03 CR. 1197(SHS), 2006 WL 12768, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2006) (expert 
testimony on al Qaeda) (“Although [the expert’s] methodology is not readily subject to 
testing and permits of no ready calculation of a concrete error rate, it is more reliable than a 
simple cherry-picking of information from websites and other sources”). 
 140. Faigman et al., supra note 4, at 1390. 
 141. Id. at 1432. 
 142. Id. at 1431–32. 
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research shows that they are the kinds of policies that are “vulnerable to 
bias.”143 
The kinds of general assessments that Dr. Bielby and others testifying in 
class certification disputes make are consistent with the scientific research 
that identifies “aggregate trends,” and their testimony stops short of making 
claims about whether any specific decision was in fact the product of 
discrimination.  Indeed, the legal issue for which social science testimony is 
being offered at class certification is not whether the employer acted with 
discriminatory intent, but whether the plaintiffs were subject to common 
employer policies or practices that satisfy the Rule 23 “commonality” 
requirement.  Social framework testimony offered by plaintiffs’ experts in 
these disputes helps the fact finder (in class certification, always a judge) to 
understand how an array of policies and practices in a particular workplace 
can operate together to create that common question.  There may be room 
for other experts or litigants or fact finders to disagree with the conclusions 
Dr. Bielby and others reach, but those kinds of disagreements go to the 
weight the testimony should be accorded, not to whether their opinions are 
admissible.144 
Ultimately, the arguments presented in Contextual Evidence of Gender 
Discrimination lack support in the case law or Rules.  The assertion that 
“linkage” of general social science research to an evaluation of a particular 
workplace policy or practice is impermissible is contrary to Rule 702, 
Supreme Court interpretation of the Rule, and the vast array of district court 
opinions demonstrating that judges, taking seriously their gatekeeping role 
with regard to admission of expert testimony, permit experts from a range 
of fields to apply their general knowledge in evaluating particular 
circumstances at issue in a dispute. 
B.  There Is No Justification for a Special Rule of Appellate Scrutiny of 
District Court Decisions To Admit Social Framework Testimony 
Among the most surprising assertions in Contextual Evidence of Gender 
Discrimination is the suggestion that the admissibility of social framework 
expert testimony should be the subject of a novel and entirely unique 
standard of appellate review.145  The authors argue that district court 
determinations on admissibility in this one context should be subject to de 
 143. See Declaration of William T. Bielby, Ph.D, supra note 65, at 25. 
 144. Daubert “quite clearly forbids trial judges to assess the validity or strength of an 
expert’s scientific conclusions, which is a matter for the jury.” Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 
U.S. 136, 154 & n.9 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  As the 
Court explained in Daubert, “[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary 
evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate 
means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 
509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993); see also Fiske & Borgida, supra note 11, at 139 (“The quality of 
the science should determine its weight, not its admissibility.”). 
 145. See Monahan et al., supra note 2, at 1742. 
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novo review on appeal.146  This suggestion is contrary to Supreme Court 
precedent and the regular practices of courts around the country. 
Just last Term, the Supreme Court decided a case that exemplifies its 
view of the relationship between appellate and district courts in evidentiary 
determinations.  The case, Sprint/United Management Co. v. 
Mendelsohn,147 involved a recurring question of evidentiary proof in 
employment discrimination cases:  should evidence of discrimination 
against other employees by other supervisors be admitted into the 
record?148  Evidence of discrimination by other supervisors is testimony by 
nonparties alleging discrimination at the hands of persons who played little 
to no role in the adverse employment decision being challenged by the 
plaintiff.149  A split panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
in Mendelsohn v. Sprint/United Management Co.150 held that the district 
court committed reversible error by appearing to adopt a blanket rule to 
exclude this kind of evidence.151 
The Supreme Court reversed in a decision that evidenced the Court’s 
commitment to the principle that district courts have broad discretion to 
determine the relevance, probative value, and reliability of expert 
testimony.152  The Court unanimously stated, citing twenty-five-year-old 
precedent, that “[a] district court is accorded a wide discretion in 
determining the admissibility of evidence under the Federal Rules.”153 
Evidentiary rulings should only be interfered with by an appellate court if 
there has been an abuse of discretion.154  The Mendelsohn Court went on to 
emphasize that “[a]n appellate court should not presume that a district court 
intended an incorrect legal result when the order is equally susceptible of a 
correct reading, particularly when the applicable standard of review is 
deferential.”155  In short, the Court concluded that the Tenth Circuit was 
wrong when it attempted to engage in its own analysis of the relevant 
factors under the Federal Rules of Evidence, and remanded with 
instructions to have the district court clarify the basis for its evidentiary 
ruling under the applicable evidentiary rules.156 
To understand why an appellate court is required to give such a wide 
berth to district court’s evidentiary rulings, it is necessary to focus on 
 146. Id. 
 147. 128 S. Ct. 1140 (2008). 
 148. Id. at 1143. 
 149. Id. 
 150. 466 F.3d 1223 (10th Cir. 2006).   
 151. Id. at 1229–30.  The Tenth Circuit majority found that it should not matter whether 
the company terminated the employee with the same supervisor who made the inculpatory 
statement at issue because such testimony helped to establish a discriminatory atmosphere. 
Id. at 1230. 
 152. Mendelsohn, 128 S. Ct. at 1146. 
 153. Id. at 1145 (quoting United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 54 (1984)) (emphasis 
added). 
 154. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 183 n.7 (1997). 
 155. Mendelsohn, 128 S. Ct. at 1146. 
 156. Id. at 1143. 
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context.  Context is of the utmost importance to a court’s analysis of the 
admissibility and significance of proffered evidence.  As the Supreme Court 
recently explained in another employment discrimination case, a “speaker’s 
meaning may depend on various factors including context, inflection, tone 
of voice, local custom, and historical usage.”157  Indeed, the importance of 
the district court’s superior ability to evaluate evidence in context explains 
why the Supreme Court has never adopted a bright line evidentiary rule 
excluding evidence based on relevance under Rule 401,158 probative value 
under Rule 403,159 or reliability of expert testimony under Daubert and 
Rule 702.160 
Evidentiary rulings should not be reversed by a reviewing court unless 
there has been a violation of the law or an abuse of discretion affecting the 
substantive right of a party.161  This strong presumption in favor of letting 
the district court’s decision stand runs throughout the evidentiary rules.  For 
instance, under Rule 401, the advisory committee’s note on the Federal 
Rules of Evidence states that “[r]elevancy is not an inherent characteristic 
of any item of evidence but exists only as a relation between an item of 
evidence and a matter properly provable in the case.”162  Similarly, Rule 
403 directs federal courts to exclude otherwise relevant evidence under 
Rule 401 “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence.”163  The very nature of this balancing exercise 
precludes bright-line rules.164  Relevance and prejudice under Rules 401 
 157. Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 456 (2006) (per curiam) (stressing the 
importance of context in employment discrimination cases). 
 158. FED. R. EVID. 401. 
 159. FED. R. EVID. 403.  “Rather than assess the relevance of the evidence itself and 
conduct its own balancing of its probative value and potential prejudicial effect, the Court of 
Appeals should have allowed the District Court to make these determinations in the first 
instance, explicitly and on the record.” Mendelsohn, 128 S. Ct. at 1146 (citing Pullman-
Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 291 (1982)).  The only exception to this normal course of 
remanding the issue back to the district court is when “the record permits only one resolution 
of the factual issue.” Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at 292.  Needless to say, this is rarely the 
case with complex questions under employment discrimination law. 
 160. FED. R. EVID. 702; Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142 (1997) (“The Court of 
Appeals suggested that Daubert somehow altered this general rule in the context of a district 
court’s decision to exclude scientific evidence.  But Daubert did not address the standard of 
appellate review for evidentiary rulings at all . . . .  Thus, while the Federal Rules of 
Evidence allow district courts to admit a somewhat broader range of scientific testimony 
than would have been admissible under Frye, they leave in place the ‘gatekeeper’ role of the 
trial judge in screening such evidence.”). 
 161. Mendelsohn, 128 S. Ct. at 1144–45. 
 162. FED. R. EVID. 401 advisory committee’s note. 
 163. FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 164. See 22 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE:  EVIDENCE § 5212 (1978) (noting the discretionary nature of Rule 403); 
Kenneth R. Kreiling, Scientific Evidence:  Toward Providing the Lay Trier with the 
Comprehensible and Reliable Evidence Necessary To Meet the Goals of the Rules of 
Evidence, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 915, 925 (1990) (recognizing “the nature of the Rule itself:  Rule 
403 is a broad rule which recognizes the large discretionary role of the judge in controlling 
  
66 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78 
 
and 403 should therefore be determined in the context of the facts and 
arguments in a particular case.165  Applying this same strong presumption 
of district court discretion to Rule 702 evaluations, the Supreme Court in 
General Electric stated emphatically that “[a] court of appeals applying 
‘abuse-of-discretion’ review to such rulings may not categorically 
distinguish between rulings allowing expert testimony and rulings 
disallowing it.”166  In short, a different standard of review does not apply to 
the district court when making a ruling on the admissibility of expert 
testimony.167 
In all, Monahan, Walker, and Mitchell cite no authority for their appellate 
review proposal.  Their mere beliefs notwithstanding, their argument goes 
against the great weight of precedent when they suggest that appellate 
courts should decide de novo whether social framework evidence should be 
able to be applied to the specific facts of the case.  As the Court recently 
stated in Mendelsohn, “[w]ith respect to evidentiary questions in general . . . 
a district court virtually always is in the better position to assess the 
admissibility of the evidence in the context of the particular case before 
it.”168 
Therefore, once the district court decides in a social framework case that 
the expert can link social framework theory to the specific facts of a case in 
a manner which would properly assist the trier of fact to determine the 
specific facts of the case, that evidentiary ruling should only be disturbed in 
the rare instance where an abuse of discretion has occurred.  An argument 
for categorical exclusion of this type of testimony is fundamentally contrary 
to both the rules of evidence and judicial application of those rules. 
III.  THE DEBATE OVER THE CONTOURS OF SOCIAL FRAMEWORK 
TESTIMONY MUST BE UNDERSTOOD AS PART OF A LARGER DEBATE  
OVER THE REACH OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 
The foregoing sections establish that social framework testimony should 
be admissible in employment discrimination class certification disputes, 
even if that testimony includes opinions about policies and practices in 
particular workplaces.  Moreover, the decision about whether a particular 
expert, offering particular information in a particular context, should be 
admitted is one for the district court to make.  Appellate courts reviewing 
the decisions made by judges about whether or not to admit social 
framework testimony should apply the same, well-established standard of 
the introduction of evidence” (citing 2 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 115, § 403.012, at 
403–09)). 
 165. Mendelsohn, 128 S. Ct. at 1147. 
 166. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142 (1997) (emphasis added). 
 167. Id. at 143 (“We hold that the Court of Appeals erred in its review of the exclusion of 
Joiner’s experts’ testimony.  In applying an overly ‘stringent’ review to that ruling, it failed 
to give the trial court the deference that is the hallmark of abuse-of-discretion review.” 
(citing Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 98–99 (1996))). 
 168. Mendelsohn, 128 S. Ct. at 1146 (emphasis added). 
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deferential review that is applied in all appellate review of admissibility 
determinations. 
Of course, just as there is no support for a categorical exclusion of social 
framework testimony in employment discrimination litigation, no reason 
exists to assume that social framework experts will always be permitted to 
testify.  Determinations as to admissibility are individualized.  The Federal 
Rules of Evidence call on the district court judge in each case to take an 
active role in assessing whether proffered testimony will be reliable and 
relevant.  Evidence law does not point to absolute admissibility; what it 
does clearly require is that a district judge engages in precisely the kind of 
evaluation that courts have appropriately been undertaking in employment 
discrimination cases for decades, and that the appellate courts apply 
precisely the kind of deferential review that has been the consistent standard 
in these same cases. 
Given the clarity of the law in this area, the arguments made in 
Contextual Evidence of Gender Discrimination present quite a radical 
agenda for change of existing law.  If evidence law does not require—or 
even support—a general exclusion of social framework testimony, then 
what is the rationale for these arguments?  The changes proposed in the 
essay are best understood as part of a larger debate that is being waged both 
in courtrooms and on the pages of academic journals. 
The litigation disputes are, in one respect, fairly straightforward:  
defendants want to exclude plaintiffs’ witnesses in support of class 
certification.  But, while that is the issue in each individual case, the larger 
battle embedded in each effort to include or exclude a witness who will 
testify about the operation of stereotyping and bias in the workplace is over 
the nature of the “intent” required by current antidiscrimination law.  Thus, 
defendants’ criticisms of social framework testimony—for example, that 
the expert should have to conduct an empirical study of this workplace or 
that the expert cannot quantify the precise amount or any specific instance 
of discrimination169—rest on an assumption that the plaintiffs can and must 
identify precisely each employment decision that was infected by invidious 
discrimination.  Plaintiffs, on the other hand, are challenging the broader 
effect of policies and practices that have limited opportunities for women, 
but in ways that may be hard to prove in some specific cases.170  The fact 
that the evidence plaintiffs present is clearer on an employer-wide basis 
than for each individual plaintiff does not mean that Title VII provides no 
remedy for a workplace in which an employer has chosen to use practices 
that systematically disadvantage women.  The debate over admissibility of 
social framework testimony is one of a set of arguments presented to courts 
about which view of Title VII—that requiring identifiable, invidious intent 
or that requiring a demonstration of systematic and obvious disadvantage—
should prevail. 
 169. See supra Part II.A. 
 170. See, e.g., Hart, supra note 7, at 784–88. 
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In the academic context, the debate is not, of course, about whether 
plaintiffs or defendants should win any particular case.  Rather, it is a 
debate about the existence of unconscious or implicit bias, the continued 
seriousness of discrimination as a force in the modern workplace, and the 
appropriate reach of legal remedies to challenge discrimination. The debate 
has drawn both legal academics and social scientists into its fray.171 
In the social science context, it is a debate centered on the validity of 
research into implicit bias and its applicability outside of the laboratory 
context.  While there do not seem to be any social science studies 
demonstrating the absence of implicit bias, there have been a number of 
recent articles challenging the research that demonstrates its existence.172  
A few of these challenges have included accusations that political bias, not 
scientific methodology, has fueled the challenged research.  Gregory 
Mitchell, for example, has written several articles with coauthor Philip 
Tetlock excoriating both the notion of implicit bias and the scientists who 
claim its existence.  They describe social psychology as “better classified as 
a form of social activism than of science,”173 and classify the scholars in 
the field as “statist-interventionists” seeking to impose a set of political 
values through their work.174  Researchers whose work focuses on whether 
and how implicit bias operates have begun to respond to these and other 
attacks.175 
In the legal academic context, the debate has been more diffuse, but 
ultimately it boils down to a disagreement over the continued pervasiveness 
of discrimination and the proper scope of federal antidiscrimination 
laws.176  In many ways mirroring the debate taking place in litigation, the 
 171. This is not a debate over whether plaintiffs or defendants should win in any 
particular case.  Rather, it is a debate about the continued seriousness of discrimination as a 
force in the modern workplace and the appropriate reach of legal remedies to challenge 
discrimination. 
 172. See, e.g., Frank J. Landy, Stereotypes, Bias, and Personnel Decisions:  Strange and 
Stranger, 1 INDUS. & ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOL. 379 (2008); The Tenuous Bridge Between 
Research and Reality, supra note 73. 
 173. Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of 
Mindreading, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1023, 1121 (2006) [hereinafter Antidiscrimination Law]. 
 174. Philip E. Tetlock & Gregory Mitchell, Unconscious Prejudice and Accountability 
Systems:  What Must Organizations Do To Check Implicit Bias?, in RESEARCH IN 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 76 (manuscript at 9–14). 
 175. See, e.g., Anthony G. Greenwald, Landy Is Correct:  Stereotyping Can Be 
Moderated by Individuating the Out-Group and by Being Accountable, 1 INDUS. & 
ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOL. 430 (2008); John T. Jost et al., An Invitation to Tetlock and 
Mitchell To Conduct Empirical Research on Implicit Bias with Friends, “Adversaries,” or 
Whomever They Please, in RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 76 ; Jost et 
al., supra note 76 (manuscript at 3–4). 
 176. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, supra note 7, at 479–80; Adam Benforado & Jon 
Hanson, Legal Academic Backlash:  The Response of Legal Theorists to Situationist Insights, 
57 EMORY L.J. 1087, 1135–40 (2008); Antidiscrimination Law, supra note 173, at 1032; 
Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, Facts Do Matter:  A Reply to Bagenstos, 37 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2009); see also King & Amin, supra note 97, at 2–3 (arguing that 
social frameworks should be viewed as an attack on the “character” of the employer and its 
agents, and therefore excluded). 
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legal academic debate has circled around whether the law can or should 
provide a remedy for the harm that results from “unthinking” 
discrimination.  It remains a subject of considerable debate whether current 
law does in fact—or should—provide a remedy in various contexts for 
employer decisions that are the result of unchecked stereotyping and 
bias.177  For those who believe the law does and should protect against 
more subtle forms of discrimination, the legal prohibitions against 
discrimination demand that employers take steps to ensure that implicit bias 
is not operating to create unequal treatment at work.  For lawyers, scholars, 
and judges who understand the prohibition against discrimination this way, 
social framework theory and the social science research that forms the base 
for current social framework expertise shed important light on the operation 
of bias in the workplace and assist legal fact finders in understanding its 
effects. 
By contrast, the argument for extremely stringent restrictions on social 
framework testimony is part of a very different perspective on what the law 
does, can, or should prohibit.  Contextual Evidence of Gender 
Discrimination can only be fully understood as part of a body of work that 
includes criticism of the theory of implicit bias and challenges to legal 
theories that provide a remedy for the kinds of subtle discrimination that 
infect workplace decisions without conscious awareness on the part of the 
decision makers.178  As employment discrimination scholar Samuel 
Bagenstos recently noted in considering arguments made by Mitchell and 
Tetlock, “[a]lthough they ostensibly attack the ‘science’ of implicit bias 
research, Mitchell and Tetlock’s real target is the normative view of 
antidiscrimination law as reaching beyond acts reflecting the individual 
fault of the discriminator.”179  Similarly, the arguments presented in 
Contextual Evidence of Gender Discrimination only make sense if they are 
understood as part of a broader attack on theories of implicit bias and the 
ways that research on stereotyping and bias has been used to support 
particular kinds of discrimination claims. 
To be clear, understanding that the arguments presented in Contextual 
Evidence of Gender Discrimination are part of a larger political perspective 
does not mean that the counterarguments are divorced from any political 
frame.  But it has become commonplace in this larger debate for opponents 
of a more inclusive view of discrimination law to accuse supporters of that 
view of political motivation, while leaving the suggestion that their 
perspective has no political motivation.  Thus, grouping law professors with 
the social psychologists whose motives they question, Mitchell and Tetlock 
refer to implicit bias scholars as “a select group of social psychologists and 
law professors—with a self-declared agenda to transform American 
 177. See, e.g., Hart, supra note 7, at 778–90. 
 178. See, e.g., Benforado & Hanson, supra note 176, at 1141–43; Antidiscrimination Law, 
supra note 173, at 1026–28, 1116. 
 179. Bagenstos, supra note 7, at 480–81. 
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law.”180  The suggestion that one side of the debate is impermissibly 
motivated by value preferences while the other is somehow free of political 
or value judgments is simply incorrect. 
In fact, each of these perspectives includes a set of political preferences 
about what employment discrimination law should prohibit and what types 
of conduct are outside of the scope of legal prohibition.  Neither perspective 
can legitimately claim neutrality.  Instead, the best arguments will combine 
full disclosure of professional interests, thoroughly substantiated doctrinal 
analyses, and some acknowledgement of the political assumptions that 
motivate and frame a particular legal argument. 
CONCLUSION 
Social framework testimony has played, and should continue to play, a 
central role in modern employment discrimination class action litigation.  
Social scientists who have researched the ways in which stereotyping and 
bias intrude into decision making can offer valuable assistance to fact 
finders.  How and whether that testimony is admissible is a determination 
that depends on the legal questions presented in the particular dispute as 
well as the proposed evidence offered by the expert.  In the context of 
disputes over the certification of employment discrimination class actions, 
social framework experts can appropriately offer both testimony about 
general social science research and opinion about whether the policies and 
practices in the particular workplace have features that could make them 
vulnerable to operation of bias.  This kind of expert testimony is directly 
relevant to one of the central questions the judge must assess for 
certification:  does the proffered class share common questions of law or 
fact?  Claims for the categorical exclusion of expert opinion as to the 
susceptibility of particular workplace policies and practices to the intrusion 
of stereotyping and bias are inconsistent with applicable evidentiary rules 
and judicial decisions.  These claims should be understood as part of a 
larger vision that questions the impact of implicit bias and stereotyping in 
the workplace and the remedial scope of antidiscrimination laws. 
 
 180. Antidiscrimination Law, supra note 173, at 1032. 
